Leonardo Paat
vs
Court of Appeals, et. Al.
GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997
266 SCRA 167
FACTS
The
truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel
while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner
Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the
owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required explanation.
The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s
action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private
respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private
respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and
Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case
contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for
their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their
motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that
the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the
truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether
or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.
HELD
The
Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted
first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.
The
doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a
case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2)
when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative
action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4)
when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5)
when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention.
A suit for
replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck
taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in
pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit
for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to
exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by
the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently
issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.
